Almost a century of scholarship-spanning a diverse set of academic literatures (theoretical economics, industrial organizational economics, amongst others) and popular press-finds that in many contexts, firms prefer to employ a small set of established individuals over a vast pool of unknown individuals. This phenomenon seems particularly pronounced in the creative industries (e.g., movies, books, and music). In the spirit of Rosen (1981) , we refer to this phenomenon as "stardom." Various theoretical models propose that stardom arise from low marginal costs (Rosen 1981) , learning (Adler 1985) , and managerial conservatism (Scharfstein & Stein 1990; Zweibel 1995; Holmström 1999) . Empirical work has documented stardom in fields as diverse as finance (Gabaix & Landier 2008) , entertainment (Einav 2010 Little, however, is formally known of stardom in crowdsourcing. There are two theoretical paradigms of stardom, which lead to conflicting predictions. On the one hand, extant research finds that stardom in the creative industries has significant informational value to the firm, its customers and its partners (Adler 1985; Liu, Mazumdar, & Li 2014) . These papers suggest that stars increase the economic value of creative products beyond the expense of additional expense of hiring stars; thus, the observed emphasis on stardom is profit optimal (Hofmann, Clement, Völckner, & Hennig-Thurau 2017). Based on this stream of research, one would expect the informational role of stardom to be even greater in crowdsourcing than in traditional enterprise. This is because crowdsourcing often attracts many submissions that vary considerably in quality. Furthermore, established members of the community are typically wellknown and respected within the community. These factors should amplify the informational value of stardom in crowdsourcing (p. 2752, Liu 2017).
On the other hand, crowdsourcing portals focused on new product development have different incentives than traditional firms. In traditional firms, new product development is centralized and involves a few, relatively homogenous individuals. Prior research suggests that stardom arises from to a principal-agent problem in the traditional firms. Managers follow the industry norm and make conservative hiring choices -they favor stars -to further their own career interests (Mukherjee & Kadiyali 2017) . In particular, new product development is plagued by outcome uncertainty-it is difficult to predict the commercial prospects of a new product (Eliashberg, Hui, & Zhang 2007). By focusing on stars, managers mitigate the effect of outcome uncertainty on their career. In crowdsourcing, however, new product development is decentralized and determined by many heterogeneous, self-selected individuals: the crowd.
Hence, the crowdsourcing portal has to consider the incentives of individuals in the crowd. crowdsourcing portal needs to ensure that it is perceived as creating a neutral arena (i.e., a level playing field) for all participants, ensuring equality of opportunity and not favoring some users over others based on preconceptions. This is in line with the notions of neutrality (Tyler 1989) and procedural rules of consistent allocation and bias-suppression (Leventhal 1980 To reduce gaming, the disaggregate votes (scores) are private and never revealed to the public. Threadless reveals the mean vote and the number of votes cast for a submitted design at the end of the voting process. At the end of voting, Threadless selects the designs that it wishes to retail. Threadless has discretion on how many (if any) designs it chooses, without being bound to a specific decision criterion.
Users whose design were selected for retail are given a modest monetary reward (US$2,000 in 2010). Users whose designs are not selected for retail are not compensated monetarily. Importantly, regardless of star status, users cannot privately negotiate a contract with Threadless. Therefore, there is no difference in marginal cost to Threadless of selecting a design from a star over a plebeian. This is different than stardom in traditional contexts.
Data and Empirical Strategy
We rely on a carefully collected large-scale dataset of all votes, all submissions, and all revenues on Threadless from January 1, 2004 to July 31, 2010. From these, we drop less than 0.05% of votes where the numerical value of the vote is missing in our data 3 . From the 150,093
designs submitted to Threadless, we drop 62 designs (less than 0.05%) where the identity of the user who submitted the design is missing, and 1 design (less than 0.01%) where the date of the submission is missing in our data. Our final dataset tracks 150,030 designs submitted by 48, 556 unique users.
Our data provides an excellent test bed to study stardom in the crowd. Second, the data allow us to map submitted designs to their commercial potential. As The conjunction of the voting data and the revenue data allows us to predict the commercial potential of all submissions, including those that were not selected for manufacture and retail by Threadless. Note that we use information available to Threadless at the time of selecting designs. Therefore, we are able to infer and evaluate its selection strategy. These features are unique to our data and context. In extant applications, however, it is challenging to both obtain commercial data on new products and to evaluate the commercial potential of product ideas that were not selected for commercialization, due to the lack of a comprehensive evaluation (voting) mechanism.
We divide submissions into three categories based on submitting user's track record: (1) submissions where the submitting user has not had a design selected by Threadless, (2) submissions where the submitting user has had 1 to 3 prior submissions selected by Threadless, and (3) submissions where the submitting user has had 4 or more prior submissions selected by Threadless. Users with more than one prior submission were separated into two categories (i.e., the second and third categories) to better illustrate the findings. In the remainder of the text, for ease of exposition, we refer to the first group as "Plebeians", and the joint of the second and third groups as "Stars". We focus on three groups of variables: (a) the votes submitted by the crowd on the design, (b) the track record of the submitting user, and (c) a year-specific fixed effect. Instead, submissions that received less positive attention, and comparable negative attention, were picked by Threadless.
---FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ---
We use machine learning methods to examine the data. The crowd's votes are of high dimensionality (they are on a 6-point scale, from 0 to 5). Furthermore, the relationship between the crowd's votes and success may be non-linear and may vary over time. Therefore, it is difficult to a priori identify the appropriate statistical model structure relating the crowd's votes to revenues. Machine learning models search over both model structure and data features to determine the most appropriate statistical model for a predictive model. Therefore, they are ideally suited to developing the empirical model. Specifically, we rely on a class of (supervised) which represents equal opportunity across stardom.
---FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE ------FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ---
If stardom did not play a role on Threadless, we would expect the quantile-to-quantile points to (on average) center on the line with slope equal to 1. Instead, Figure 3 shows that across all quantiles, the predicted revenue for selected designs from Stars is higher than designs from
Plebeians. In particular, across all percentiles, only higher commercial potential designs from In addition, the findings show that (1) the predicted revenues for unselected designs (at all percentiles) are higher for Stars than Plebeians, and (2) the predicted revenues for a significant number of designs by Stars are higher than those for designs by Plebeians. This implies that, as suggested by Figure 1 where for a number of unselected submissions by the Stars, the number of positive votes is substantially higher than the number of positive votes for selected submissions by Plebeians, Threadless is under-selecting (high commercial potential)
submissions from Stars in favor of (low commercial potential) designs from Plebeians. Table 2 describes the deciles of these groups over the years of the dataset. Across all years (rows) and all deciles (columns), we see the same trend as depicted in Figure 3 . Therefore, the bias identified in Figure 3 is both pervasive and persistent across the 90 months covered in our data.
---TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---
Discussion
Inequality due to stardom is a distressing, yet ubiquitous, phenomenon. Today, corporate
America's stars-its top CEOs, ace investment bankers, and hotshot lawyers-receive a greater share of total remuneration than any time prior in modern history. The rising inequality in wages and opportunity has led to increasing calls for governmental action, in part due to a perception that without intervention, inequality may beget more inequality (Sands 2017) . Broadly, scholars are pessimistic about the future (Piketty 2017 ). In sum, our findings suggest that open innovation may help reduce inequity. Stardom is rooted in information asymmetry (Adler 1985) and managerial conservatism (Zwiebel 1995 
